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MEDIA MISBEHAVIOR AND THE WAGES OF SIN:
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES




Driven by competitive forces and enabled by technological advances such as
hidden cameras, the media have become increasingly intrusive in their
newsgathering techniques. Claims against the media for unlawful acts such as
invasion of privacy, trespass, and fraud highlight the severe tension existing be-
tween the rights of the victims of media misconduct and the principles of the First
Amendment. The authors contend that by acting unlawfully in their newsgathering,
the media forfeit First Amendment protection. They emphasize that the
newsworthiness of the information unlawfully obtained by the media should not be
considered when determining liability, and conclude that the media should be held
liable for all damages, including consequential damages, that arise from their
tortious or unlawful acts.
INTRODUCTION
Newsgatherers do not have special access to information not available to
the public, nor do any of society's rules, including the constitutional protec-
tion of free speech, immunize the media from sanctions for the commission
of unlawful acts.' This Article takes these principles a step further, and
* Mr. Walsh is a Partner at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft in New York and spe-
cializes in First Amendment law. Mr. Selby and Ms. Schaffer are Associates at the
firm. Mr. Walsh was lead trial counsel for the plaintiffs in the libel cases of
Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co. and DeRoburt v. Gannett Co. He also represented
Food Lion, Inc. in its landmark RICO claim against Capital Cities/ABC based on
PrimeTime Live's use of deception and hidden cameras to obtain videotape for a seg-
ment in 1992.
' See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1991) (acknowledg-
ing the "well-established line of decisions holding that generally applicable laws do not
offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has in-
cidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news," and holding that the First
Amendment does not confer on the press a constitutional right to disregard promises
that would otherwise be enforced under state law); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
690 (1972) (holding that the First Amendment is not violated by requiring reporters to
testify before grand juries); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 130-33 (1937)
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argues that the First Amendment does not shield the media against claims
for damages arising out of the publication of the ill-gotten fruits of inten-
tional, illegal newsgathering activity.2
New information-gathering techniques used by the media, such as sur-
veillance, posing, audio or videotaping with concealed devices, and eaves-
dropping, may violate civil or criminal law with respect to individual or
corporate rights of privacy. This Article will discuss the increasingly intru-
sive, and, in the view of many, irresponsible behavior of the media in
newsgathering activities, and will argue that victims of such conduct should
not be limited to damages for the initial wrongful act-for example, an act
of trespass or deception-but should also be permitted to recover all conse-
quential damages resulting from the publication of the information gained
thereby. Recent cases involving claims against the media for invasion of
privacy, trespass, fraud, misrepresentation, breach of contract, and broken
promises, to name a few, suggest that damages flowing from publication by
the tortfeasor or law-breaker are not constitutionally barred, even where the
published material is truthful.3
The logical underpinning of our thesis is that once the media, with the
objective of obtaining material to publish, intentionally engage in an activity
violative of general laws, they forfeit all First Amendment protection to
which they would be entitled if the news was gathered lawfully We argue
(noting that enforcement of labor laws against the press does not violate the First
Amendment).
2 For purposes of this Article, "intentional, illegal newsgathering activity" includes
deliberate acts violative of civil or criminal law, such as trespass, intrusion, fraud, mis-
representation, breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, and broken prom-
ises by media personnel while gathering news. "News" includes information in the
broadest sense, and "gathering" refers to all conceivable methods, from simple observa-
tion to surreptitious electronic recording.
' See, e.g., Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669-70. In Cohen, the published information was
true (i.e., the identity of a source who was promised anonymity), yet the Supreme Court
held that compensatory damages may be constitutionally awarded on a theory of prom-
issory estoppel. Id. at 670. The Supreme Court concluded that the characterization of
the payment of damages "makes no difference for First Amendment purposes when the
law being applied is a general law." Id.
" Even the so-called "reporter's privilege" has not yet been recognized by the Su-
preme Court. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681 (denying a privilege to a reporter called
as a grand jury witness in a criminal investigation, but leaving open the question of
whether such a privilege is otherwise available by its recognition that "without some
protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated");
Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249-50 (9th Cir. 1971) (stating that constitu-
tional privileges "developed in defamation cases and to some extent in privacy actions
in which publication is an essential component are not relevant in determining liability
for intrusive conduct antedating publication"). But see Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe
Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 594-96 (1st Cir. 1980) (interpreting Branzburg as recog-
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that the inevitable consequence of this point is that newsgatherers should not
then be permitted to claim the shield of the First Amendment to protect
them from damages consequential to the publication of the illegally or tor-
tiously obtained material. Thus, the truth or falsity of what is published as a
result of such activity should not be the determinative factor. Nor should the
"public interest" in the dissemination of information so obtained outweigh
the compelling public interest in compliance with the law by all citizens and
its evenhanded application, including the common law rules of compensato-
ry damages.
Part I of this Article will discuss the conflict between the First Amend-
ment freedoms of speech and the press and an individual's right to privacy.
Part II will review common law bases for newsgatherer liability, such as
intrusion, trespass, fraud, and breach of contract, and will analyze the cases
interpreting the interaction between such illegal activities and the First
Amendment. Finally, Part III will discuss the arguments for and against
awarding compensatory damages arising from the publication of illegally
obtained material. We conclude that the First Amendment, properly con-
strued, should not override laws of general applicability, including general
principles of damages, and should not preclude courts from taking the ef-
fects of publication into account in their assessment of damages.
I. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN TWO PROTECTED INTERESTS:
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS AND THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY
A. Theoretical Conflict
Numerous commentators have argued that the First Amendment and the
public's "right to know"5 immunize newsgatherers from liability for damag-
es resulting from the publication of illegally obtained material.6 Others,
equally concerned with securing the rights protected by the First Amend-
ment, but also troubled by the media's disregard of other protected interests,
contend that damages resulting from a newsgatherer's invasion of an
individual's right to privacy," in their person and property, should be fully
nizing a conditional privilege found by balancing the potential harm to the free flow of
information that might result by granting a privilege against the public's need for the
information).
5 Justice Douglas noted in his dissent in Branzburg that "[t]he press has a preferred
position in our constitutional scheme, not to enable it to make money, not to set
newsmen apart as a favored class, but to bring fulfillment to the public's right to
know." Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 721 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
6 See, e.g., Alfred Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76
COLUM. L. REV. 1205 (1976); David F. Freedman, Note, Press Passes and Trespasses:
Newsgathering on Private Property, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1298 (1984).
' See infra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing the four recognized privacy
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compensated, including recovery of all consequential damages resulting
from subsequent publication! This controversy can be summarized as a
clash between two sets of traditionally protected and cherished interests:
freedom of speech and press, combined with the public's right to know,
against an individual's right to personal privacy and the protection of prop-
erty. The United States Supreme Court's decision in Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co.9 supports the conclusion that the latter value should prevail in the
courts when the party claiming First Amendment protection has deliberately
violated the law to gather information.
B. First Amendment Protections and Limitations
The First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States provides,
in part, that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press."'" The Fourteenth Amendment renders this prohibi-
tion equally applicable to the states," and thus state laws impacting upon
the operation of the press must, when challenged, pass constitutional mus-
ter. 2 In addition, many states have their own constitutional provisions pro-
tecting freedom of speech and the press, some of which provide even broad-
er protection than the First Amendment."
The heightened protection of speech afforded by the First Amendment
has been held to apply to those torts that include publication as a requisite
element, the most common of which is defamation." Thus, for example, in
torts).
' See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, The Right of Privacy and Freedom of the Press, 14
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 329 (1979).
9 501 U.S. 663 (1991); see also supra note 1.
'o U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931) (noting that the rights pro-
tected by the First Amendment are applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment).
2 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 664 (1925).
' See, e.g., Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 1278 (N.Y.) (inter-
preting New York's constitutional free speech provision as offering separate and distinct
protections from the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution), cert. denied, 500
U.S. 954 (1991). The free speech clause in California's constitution is almost identical
to that of New York's. Compare CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(a) with N.Y. CONST. art. I,
§ 8. Both provisions provide that all citizens given the freedom to speak, write, and
publish must be "responsible for the abuse of [that] right." See CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 2(a); N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8. We make no attempt in this Article to address the po-
tentially broader protections granted by state free speech provisions.
14 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), brought the award of
money damages for defamation within the protections of the First Amendment. The Su-
preme Court interpreted the First Amendment as prohibiting states from enforcing libel
judgments in favor of public officials without proof that the defendant acted with "actu-
1114 [Vol. 4:3
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a defamation case, it is necessary to prove that the defendant acted with
"actual malice" with respect to the truth or falsity of published information
about public officials or "public figures."15 Further, although proof of the
"truth" of published material has always been a defense to all claims of
defamation, First Amendment considerations have now placed on such "pub-
lic official" or "public figure" defamation plaintiffs the burden of proving
falsity. 16 These First Amendment protections, however, are not applicable
to prepublication events associated with newsgathering, and it is generally
understood that the First Amendment does not immunize the media from
liability for illegal acts committed in their pursuit of information. 7 We rec-
ognize that a necessary prerequisite to publishing the news is the right to
gather it,'8 but we submit that this truism does not give newsgatherers li-
cense to engage in unlawful conduct in their pursuit of something to pub-
lish.
al malice," that is, with knowledge of the statement's falsity or with reckless disregard
of its truth. Id. at 279-80; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A (1977).
In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), the Court extended the Sullivan standard to
encompass money damage awards for "false light" invasion of privacy actions, in which
publication is a requisite element. Id. at 387 (holding that a private plaintiff involved in
a matter of public interest must prove that the material was published with "actual mal-
ice"). It is unclear whether Sullivan's "actual malice" standard is applicable to other pri-
vacy actions that include publication as a requisite element. See RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 652A-E; see also James E. King & Frederick T. Muto, Compensatory
Damages for Newsgatherer Torts: Toward a Workable Standard, 14 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 919, 948 (1981) (arguing that although "the method used to acquire the informa-
tion should not be the sole determinant of the damages for publication issue, it should
not be wholly ignored either"). Publication is not a requisite element of the privacy tort
of intrusion. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A-E.
1 See supra note 14.
16 See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775-76 (1986)
(noting that a public figure plaintiff must show falsity of media defendant's statements,
and holding that a private figure plaintiff alleging defamation also has the burden of
proving the falsity of a media defendant's speech on matters of public concern).
17 See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (noting that
"generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their en-
forcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the
news"); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 683 (1972) (holding that the First Amend-
ment does not grant the press immunity from the application of "general laws"); Galella
v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995-96 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that crimes and torts commit-
ted in newsgathering are not constitutionally protected, and that "[t]here is no threat to a
free press in requiring its agents to act within the law"); Dietemann v. Time Inc., 449
F.2d 245, 249-50 (9th Cir. 1971) (recognizing that First Amendment protections cover-
ing publication are "not relevant in determining liability for intrusive conduct antedating
publication").
18 See, e.g., Allen v. Combined Communications Corp., 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
2417, 2420 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 22, 1981).
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The argument for holding the media liable for all consequences of their
unlawful conduct finds helpful and meaningful analogy in Fourth Amend-
ment search and seizure jurisprudence. Evidence, physical or testimonial,
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be suppressed-the
state is not permitted to use such evidence in its case against a defendant
who suffered the constitutional violation.9 Furthermore, evidence that is
uncovered subsequent to, and by reason of, the initial violation may be
deemed "fruit of the poisonous tree" if found to be derived from the initial
unconstitutional seizure.2' The Supreme Court has consistently recognized
that one of the purposes of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule is to
deter unreasonable searches, no matter how probative their fruits."' This
justification for excluding illegally obtained evidence from the state's case is
similar to the reasoning behind refusing to free the media from the damag-
ing consequences of illegal newsgathering activity. Both rules deter illegal
activity (in one case by society's agents, in the other by the media's agents)
and protect privacy rights, even when there are other competing and laud-
able goals (in one case prosecuting crime, in the other, furthering the
public's right to know).
C. Protection of Privacy
A law review article by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis enti-
tled The Right to Privacy22 is generally credited as the first compelling as-
sertion that a cause of action in tort should be recognized for an invasion of
"privacy." Warren and Brandeis described this right as the "right to be let
alone."23 From this basic concept have evolved four distinct kinds of com-
mon law invasion of privacy torts: (1) intrusion upon one's physical solitude
or seclusion; (2) public disclosure of private facts; (3) publicity that places
someone in false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation of one's
name or likeness for another's benefit.24 Several states have incorporated a
"right to privacy" in their state constitutions. 5 One court decision even
recognized a corporation's right to keep private business information within
19 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that "all evidence ob-
tained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is ... inadmissible").
2 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Evidence obtained by indepen-
dent means not connected to the poisonous tree, however, may still be used. Nix v. Wil-
liams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (describing the "independent source" doctrine).
21 See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
2 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv.
193 (1890).
23 Id. at 195.
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A-E (1977).
2 For example, California and Illinois provide individuals with certain constitutional
guarantees of privacy. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6.
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the corporation.26 With respect to privacy actions, this Article will focus on
only the most egregious conduct of newsgatherers, that of intrusion, which
includes, among other conduct, eavesdropping, taping, surveillance, hidden
cameras, and trespass.
D. Case Law
The Supreme Court in Branzburg v. Hayes2 7 specifically noted that the
press possess no "constitutional right of special access to information not
available to the public generally. '' 28 Thus, newsgatherers' access to infor-
mation is subject to the same limitations as is access by the general public.
Many cases preceding and following Branzburg have similarly refused to
extend any additional or special protection to media defendants in tort or
contract suits involving newsgathering.
In Dietemann v. Time, Inc.,29 for example, the Ninth Circuit held that
two Life magazine employees who used false identities to gain access to the
home of the plaintiff-an alleged medical "quack"-and subsequently re-
corded their conversations with him, were completely unprotected by the
First Amendment.3" Similarly, in Galella v. Onassis,3" the Second Circuit
refused to hold that the First Amendment set up a wall of immunity protect-
ing newsgatherers from liability while gathering news. To the contrary, the
Second Circuit held that "[t]here is no such scope to the First Amendment
right. Crimes and torts committed in newsgathering are not protected.
3 2
More recently, in Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.," a feder-
al district court in North Carolina held that ABC did not have immunity
2 In Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010, vacated, 737 F.2d 1170
(D.C. Cir. 1984), Judge Tamm discussed precluding the Washington Post from using
Mobil corporate information obtained in discovery, and suggested that a corporation
may have a recognizable protected interest, similar to a right to privacy, to keep its in-
formation private. Id. at 1019-22. Although the decision was subsequently vacated due
to an intervening Supreme Court decision, Judge Tamm's discussion is interesting to
note because he considered a corporation's privacy interests under the Fourth Amend-
ment, and suggested a balancing approach as against competing interests. Id. at 1022-
29.
27 408 U.S. 665 (1971).
28 Id. at 684.
29 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
'o Id. at 249. The reporters in Dietemann acted in concert with law enforcement au-
thorities and posed as prospective patients to gain entrance to plaintiff's home and
speak to him in a room he used as an office. The reporters took photographs and re-
corded conversations that were subsequently used in an article describing the doctor as
a "quack." Id. at 245-46.
" 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
32 Id. at 995.
33 887 F. Supp. 811 (M.D.N.C. 1995).
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under the First Amendment from damages for alleged wrongful and illegal
acts under state law, notably fraud and trespass, committed during its under-
cover "investigation" of Food Lion supermarkets.' According to this court,
"the First Amendment does not prevent a plaintiff from recovering damages
when the press has violated a law of general applicability."35
Following the lead of the Supreme Court in Branzburg, it is evident that
most lower courts that have considered the issue have refused to extend
First Amendment protection where state law proscribes all or some of the
actions taken in the newsgathering process.36 These courts have demon-
strated that they will not readily interfere with state-proscribed unlawful
conduct to grant the press constitutional immunity from tort or contract
liability incurred while gathering news. In a nutshell, the First Amendment
is no defense to such violations.37
II. UNLAWFUL CONDUCT AND THE MEDIA: STATE LAWS PROSCRIBING
INTRUSION, TRESPASS, BREACH OF CONTRACT, AND FRAUD
Today, competitive pressures among the media have created a frenzy in
reporters, editors, correspondents, and producers to catch a sensational sto-
ry.3" The new technology that gives the media the ability to capture dra-
matic or otherwise marketable images on tape or film also creates incentives
to use illegal methods to position people where that technology can be em-
ployed, often secretly. Thus, state laws, particularly those protecting privacy,
have recently been invoked with greater frequency and success to place
limits on the media and to protect an individual's, and even a business's,
zone of privacy.39
34 Id. at 822.
31 Id. at 821.
36 But cf. Scheetz v. Morning Call, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1515, 1527 (E.D. Pa. 1990)
(granting defendant's motion for summary judgment after balancing the press's First
Amendment rights against the individual's right of privacy), affd, 946 F.2d 202 (3d
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1095 (1992).
3' But see infra Part II.A (discussing some courts' balancing of First Amendment in-
terests).
38 Many articles have been written about the scathing competition among newsmaga-
zine shows. See, e.g., Frederic M. Biddle, Viewers Can't Get Enough of News Maga-
zines, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 23, 1994, at 65 (remarking that "the pressure is on. From
'Prime Time Live' to Fox's 'Front Page', the newsmagazines are fighting for an identi-
ty"); see also Marc Gunther, Prime-Time News Blues; Magazine Shows Try to Regroup
After a Bad Year, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 1995, at G7 (reporting that "the competition
and rating pressure drove down the quality of journalism on the magazines [and that]
ABC, in particular, has been hit with a flurry of lawsuits, particularly over hidden-
camera reporting").
" As noted previously, California's constitution recognizes an individual's right to
privacy. See supra note 25. Kersis v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 22 Media L. Rep.
1118 [Vol. 4:3
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A. Intrusion and Trespass
1. Intrusion
Claims involving media liability based on newsgathering activities often
arise in the context of allegations that a newsgatherer intruded into an
individual's seclusion or solitude, either by physical or electronic means.
Unlike other invasion of privacy claims that hinge on the publication of
information gathered by a journalist, a claim of intrusion is more akin to the
traditional torts of harassment, trespass, wiretapping, and assault and bat-
tery.40 For those states that recognize a cause of action for "intrusion, ' 41
liability will attach where a newsgatherer "intentionally intrudes, physically
or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs
or concerns ... [and where] the intrusion would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person., 42 A claim for intrusion is different from other privacy
(BNA) 2321 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 1994), a case decided under this provision, held
that ABC's surreptitious videotaping of plaintiffs' office conversation gave rise to a
cause of action under the California constitution. Id. at 2330-31. With respect to the ar-
gument that a corporation may have a right to privacy, see Tavoulareas v. Washington
Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 737 F.2d 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1994), where
Judge Tamm described Mobil corporate information as private. Id. at 1019-22; see also
supra note 26.
o See Thomas J. Groger, Annotation, First Amendment As Immunizing Newsmen
from Liability for Tortious Conduct While Gathering News, 28 A.L.R. FED. 904, 905
n.3 (1976).
4' Almost all states recognize some form of privacy rights, and only approximately
nine states do not recognize the tort of intrusion. LIBEL DEFENSE RESOURCE CENTER,
50-STATE SURVEY 1994-95 (Henry R. Kaufman ed., 1994). New York, Minnesota,
Montana, and Virginia, for example, are some of the states that do not recognize the
common law privacy tort of intrusion. See, e.g., Hurwitz v. United States, 884 F.2d 684
(2d Cir. 1989) (noting that New York does not recognize any common law privacy
torts, but recognizes several express statutory causes of action-for example, "false
light"--none of which are akin to "intrusion"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990).
42 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977); see also Rifkin v. Esquire
Publishing, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1384 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1982) (holding that "in-
trusion" must go beyond the limits of decency and finding that a reporter's mere solici-
tation of plaintiff's friends and family members for assistance in contacting plaintiff
was not actionable). In Magenis v. Fisher Broadcasting, Inc., 798 P.2d 1106 (Or. Ct.
App. 1990), a news company that accompanied police on a search pursuant to a war-
rant, filmed and later broadcast the police raid on plaintiff's house. Id. at 1107-08. The
court held that mere trespass is not enough to sustain an intrusion claim; the conduct
must have been both highly intrusive and highly offensive to a reasonable person. Id. at
1110.
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torts43 because it does not require publication as a requisite element of the
offense. The tort is committed and completed upon the intrusion."
One of the first cases to discuss liability for intrusion with respect to a
media defendant was Pearson v. Dodd.45 In Pearson, Senator Thomas
Dodd sued newspaper columnists Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson for
publishing information from documents that were removed and copied by
two members of Dodd's staff, without permission, from the Senator's of-
fice.46 The documents revealed financial misdeeds and led to the Senator's
admonition by the Senate. 47 The court held for the defendants on the theory
that mere publication of material obtained by another's intrusion does not
render the publisher liable.48
Subsequent cases have held the media liable for intrusion, despite claims
of First Amendment protection. For example, in Dietemann v. Time, Inc.,
the Ninth Circuit held that "[n]o interest protected by the First Amendment
is adversely affected by permitting damages for intrusion."49 The court
sustained a cause of action for invasion of privacy upon proof that defen-
dants, by subterfuge, gained entrance to the plaintiff's home, photographed
the plaintiff, and electronically recorded and transmitted to third persons the
plaintiff's conversation without his consent.5" The Ninth Circuit did not
measure the newsworthiness of, or the "public interest" in, the subject mat-
ter, but rather focused on the method of newsgathering, and opined that no
First Amendment interest protects the news media from "calculated mis-
deeds."51 The court further noted: "The First Amendment is not a license to
trespass, to steal, or to intrude by electronic means into the precincts of
another's home or office. It does not become such a license simply because
the person subjected to the intrusion is reasonably suspected of committing
" See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing the four recognized privacy
torts); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A. This Article limits its dis-
cussion of privacy torts to intrusion.
" Thus, a plaintiff can recover for intrusion even if the footage is never broadcast or
the information never published. See Ayeni v. CBS Inc., 848 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.N.Y.),
affd sub nom. Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1689 (1995). Intrusion claims in the newsgathering context are often coupled with
claims for trespass, fraud, and misrepresentation.
4- 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969).
46 Id. at 703.
47 Id.
" Id. at 705. The court noted, however, that intrusion could be found by "unautho-
rized bugging of a dwelling, tapping a telephone, snooping through windows, and over-
zealous shadowing ... whether or not accompanied by trespasses to property." Id. at
704 (footnotes omitted).
4 Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249-50 (9th Cir. 1971).
' Id. at 249.
Id. at 250 (citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 384 n.9, 389-90 (1967)).
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a crime."52 Thus, although the court recognized that "newsgathering is an
integral part of news dissemination," it refused to hold that the First Amend-
ment shielded newsgatherers from liability for invasion of privacy.53
Twenty-five years later, Dietemann resonates in the technological "star
wars" of media competitors striving to capture the hearts and minds of the
reading and viewing public.54 Following Dietemann's lead, the Second Cir-
cuit, in Galella v. Onassis, refused to extend a First Amendment privilege to
a photographer who, "intrusively" and in a "harassing manner," attempted to
photograph Mrs. Onassis and her family." Mrs. Onassis subsequently ob-
tained an order requiring Galella to remain a certain distance away from
them. Galella argued that the First Amendment set up "a wall of immunity
protecting newsmen from any liability for their conduct while gathering
news."56 The Second Circuit gave him short shrift, holding that "[tihere is
no such scope to the First Amendment right. Crimes and torts committed in
news gathering are not protected."57 The court thus affirmed the injunction
curtailing Galella's behavior. The court further noted that the injunction was
particularly compelling in light of the "de minimis public importance" of the
daily activities of Mrs. Onassis" and because of Galella's "inexcusable"
conduct toward Mrs. Onassis's minor children.59
a. Public Place
Those courts that have refused to find an actionable intrusion usually
have done so because the subject was in a public place or was viewed from
a public vantage point. For example, the Southern District of New York
found no intrusion where a television reporter's attempted interview of a
company president was in a semi-public place outside the company's build-
ing, and the company president was visible to the public eye.6' Similarly,
52 Id. at 249.
3 Id. at 250. Because the First Amendment was inapplicable, the court in Dietemann
held that state law applied. Id.
' See supra note 38 and accompanying text (reporting on the immense pressures
and heightened competition between news magazines).
5 487 F.2d 986, 993 (2d Cir. 1973). In one of his many attempts to photograph the
family, Galella jumped out in front of Mrs. Onassis's son John while he was riding his
bicycle in Central Park, causing him to swerve dangerously. Id.
36 Id. at 995.
57 Id.
5" Id. This statement evidences the Second Circuit's consideration of the
"newsworthiness" of the material, and hence that court's engagement of a First Amend-
ment balancing analysis. See infra part III.B for a discussion of "newsworthiness."
59 Id.
0 Machleder v. Diaz, 538 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (applying New Jersey
law), later proceeding, 618 F. Supp. 1367 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
801 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088 (1987).
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no claim for intrusion was found by the Eighth Circuit where a journalist
tape-recorded boisterous complaints made by a former municipal judge
while the former judge was detained in jail on a charge of driving while
intoxicated,6 or by a federal court in Oregon where two journalists photo-
graphed an arrestee inside a county jail during a booking procedure.62
Moreover, in Mark v. Seattle Times,63 the Washington Supreme Court
found that the actions of a television cameraman, who filmed a pharmacist
indicted for Medicaid fraud through the window of a locked pharmacy, did
not constitute an "intrusion" because the locus of the filming was open to
the public and any passerby could have viewed the scenes recorded by the
camera.6
The common thread among these cases that refuse to find an intrusion is
that the plaintiff was not subjected to a "physical intrusion analogous to a
trespass."'65 Thus, where a person is in a public place or is viewed from a
public vantage point, the courts seem less likely to find that tortious conduct
has occurred. These cases make it very clear that there is a whole range of
media activity that does not rise to the level of an actionable "intrusion."
Accordingly, we need not fear that a rule which holds the media liable for
consequential damages arising from an actionable intrusion will chill all
newsgathering. Only the most egregious newsgathering conduct will rise to
the level of an intrusion or trespass, and only in these situations would a
court be faced with the issue of awarding compensable damages.
b. Balancing of the First Amendment: Newsworthiness
Although newsgatherer conduct is examined to determine whether it
reaches the level of an actionable intrusion, some courts have also inquired
into the "newsworthiness" of the subject matter, sometimes holding that
"newsworthiness" triggers the protections of the First Amendment.66 Ac-
61 Holman v. Central Ark. Broadcasting Co., 610 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1979).
62 Huskey v. Dallas Chronicle, Inc., 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1057 (D. Or. June 10,
1986).
63 635 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1124 (1982).
I d. at 1095. The court also added that the pharmacist was visible on the film clip
for only 13 seconds, was not shown in any embarrassing positions, and his facial fea-
tures were not recognizable. Id. at 1094-95.
65 See Mary Ann L. Wymore, Modernizing the Law of Privacy, 40 FED. B. NEWS &
J. 374, 376 (1993) (arguing for the abolition of the intrusion cause of action because it
is subsumed by trespass). Our Article rejects the premise that intrusion is a superfluous
tort, and argues that the "highly offensive" requirement of an intrusion cause of action
clearly distinguishes it from trespass, thus protecting different and separable interests.
66 See Costlow v. Cusimano, 311 N.Y.S.2d 92, 95 (App. Div. 1970) (holding that
"once the subject matter is found suitable for public concern, the constitutional
guarantees attach, and liability may be premised only on falsification resulting from ac-
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cordingly, in Cox Communications, Inc. v. Lowe,67 the Georgia Court of
Appeals, in holding that a physical intrusion analogous to a trespass was re-
quired to recover for an intrusion upon seclusion, also analyzed and dis-
cussed the newsworthiness of the story.68 In Cox Communications, a pris-
oner was videotaped through a prison fence from a public parking lot for a
news story on the improper use of prison labor. The court held that there
was no actionable intrusion, in part because the story was "newsworthy. 69
Similarly, in Haynik v. Zimlich," in holding that there was no liability for
intrusion where the media merely observes, films, or records a person in
public, the Ohio Court of Appeals stated that there was no "intrusion upon
seclusion" where the subject matter of the news report "ha[d] absolutely
nothing to do with plaintiff's secret, secluded, or private concerns," but
instead concerned only "matters falling within the realm of legitimate public
interest, and not within the domain of any private seclusion which plaintiff
has thrown about his person or affairs."'" Finally, as mentioned above, the
Second Circuit in Galella noted the "de minimis public importance" of the
photographed activities, and may have used this as a basis for justifying the
injunction.72
2. Trespass
Another common cause of action against newsgatherers is trespass,
defined as any unauthorized entry onto another's premises.73 Trespass juris-
prudence with respect to newsgathering has developed along similar lines as
that of intrusion. Although newsgatherers will, with few exceptions, usually
be held liable for their trespasses, courts have split over whether private
property rights need to be balanced against asserted First Amendment inter-
tual malice").
67 328 S.E.2d 384 (Ga. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 982 (1985).
6 Id. at 386.
69 Id.
70 508 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1986).
Id. at 200. In Haynik, a drug suspect was filmed in a public hallway of the
sheriff's department. Id. at 196.
' Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995 (1973). The Second Circuit noted that legit-
imate countervailing social needs may, at times, warrant some intrusion despite an
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy and freedom from harassment. Id.
' See Desnick v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 1351 (7th Cir. 1995) (not-
ing that "[t]o enter upon another's land without consent is a trespass" and refusing to
recognize a "journalists' privilege" to trespass). Because most intrusion cases emphasize
the protection of the home, there often is overlap between trespass and intrusion in the
newsgathering context. In fact, some courts treat the torts identically. See Florida Pub-
lishing Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977);
see also supra note 65 (discussing the similarities and differences between the two
torts).
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ests. Most of the cases have eschewed such a balancing approach, taking
their cue from the Ninth Circuit's clear declaration in Dietemann that the
First Amendment "is not a license to trespass. 74 Thus, many subsequent
cases involving media trespass have refused to acknowledge, or balance, any
special First Amendment interests.
a. No Balancing of the First Amendment
Cases following Dietemann have found an actionable trespass without
balancing First Amendment concerns. In Le Mistral, Inc. v. CBS Inc.,'
CBS television reporters entered an expensive restaurant without consent.
CBS was found liable for trespass because its camera crew entered
plaintiff's restaurant with "cameras rolling" in a "noisy and obtrusive fash-
ion" after learning that the restaurant had been cited for health code viola-
tions.77 The restaurant was open to the public, but the reporters entered
without intent to obtain service and without consent to tape or broadcast.78
The jury awarded the restaurant owner $1200 in compensatory damages and
$250,000 in punitive damages for the reporters' trespass and alleged damage
to the business. 79 The appellate court, relying on Dietemann, quickly dis-
posed of CBS's First Amendment defense and affirmed the lower court
decision, noting that "the First Amendment is not a shibboleth before which
all other rights must succumb."8
Similarly, the criminal appellate court in Stahl v. Oklahoma8 refused to
balance any First Amendment interests. Stahl involved a mass protest by
anti-nuclear power activists at the construction site of a nuclear power plant.
Nine reporters followed 339 protesters across the boundary fence, ignoring a
"no trespassing" sign, to cover the demonstration." The reporters later pub-
lished accounts of an encounter between the protesters and the sheriff which
they were only able to see because they had unlawfully crossed the fence.83
The reporters were charged and subsequently found liable for trespass. The
trial court rejected the reporters' First Amendment defense, although it bal-
anced the First Amendment interest in access against the owner's property
4 Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (1971).
75 402 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817 (App. Div. 1978).
76 Id. at 816.
17 Id. at 816 & n.1.
78 Id. at 816 n.1.
79 Id. at 818.
80 Id. at 817.
81 665 P.2d 839 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1069 (1984).
82 Id. at 840.
83 Oklahoma v. Bernstein, 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2313, 2323-24 (Okla. Dist. Ct.
Jan. 21, 1980), affd sub nom. Stahl v. Oklahoma, 665 P.2d 839 (Okla. Crim. App.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1069 (1984).
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rights.' In affirming the convictions, however, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals followed the no-balancing methodology of the Dietemann
line of cases."
More recently in Ayeni v. CBS Inc.,86 a CBS Street Stories camera
crew, with Secret Service agents' permission, followed agents while they
executed a search warrant in the home of a man suspected of credit card
fraud. 7 A federal court in New York held that CBS's taping of the
suspect's wife and child, despite their on-camera objections, exceeded the
limited purpose of the warrant and constituted an illegal seizure under the
Fourth Amendment. 8 CBS's motion to dismiss the trespass claim was de-
nied because there was no "qualified immunity" for the media, even when
acting with government's permission. 9
Finally, in United States v. Sanusi,° a criminal case related to Ayeni, a
New York federal district court, in ruling on CBS's motion to quash a sub-
poena on First Amendment grounds, noted that "[w]hile the First Amend-
ment provides the press with a shield from government censorship, the press
may not use this protection to justify otherwise illegal actions."'" CBS
could not assert a privilege with respect to the subpoena which sought pro-
duction of their illegally obtained tapes.2 Citing a litany of cases, including
Dietemann, the court refused to let the First Amendment shield the media
from laws of general applicability.93
8 Id.
85 Stahl, 665 P.2d at 841-42.
86 848 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.N.Y.), affd sub nom. Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680 (2d
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1689 (1995).
87 Id. at 364-65. The crew filmed the suspect's wife cowering in her nightgown, hid-
ing her face with a magazine, and pleading not to be filmed. The suspect's pre-school
age son was also filmed during the search, hiding behind a couch crying. Id.
8 Id. at 368.
89 Id. The civil claim against CBS was thereafter settled, and the settlement was
sealed. This case is particularly noteworthy because it was the first case to find that the
media, under certain circumstances, can become so closely intertwined with government
operations that they can be treated as a "state actor" with consequent constitutional lia-
bility under the Fourth Amendment. Cases such as Ayeni, and WROC-TV, Baugh, and
Fletcher, discussed infra, flow from the current popularity of the news and feature
segments known as "ride-alongs," showing live footage of police or emergency authori-
ties in action.
9' 813 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
91 Id. at 155.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 155-56.
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b. Balancing of the First Amendment: Newsworthiness
Nevertheless, some courts have still applied a balancing approach with
respect to media trespass actions. In Allen v. Combined Communications
Corp.," for example, plaintiffs brought a trespass and defamation suit
against a television station whose reporters entered plaintiffs' property to
report on a city official's investigation of their business.9" The court re-
fused to dismiss the trespass claim on First Amendment grounds, but reject-
ed the Dietemann conclusion that the First Amendment was entirely inappli-
cable.96 Instead, the court held that in order to avoid summary judgment,
plaintiffs had to show that the reporters knowingly and intentionally had
committed a trespass, that they had committed a trespass in reckless disre-
gard of such knowledge, or that the plaintiff had suffered damage because
of the trespass.97 The court found newsgathering inseparable from news
publication and declared the necessity of "open[ing] the umbrella of the
First Amendment to all of these activities which are necessary to the publi-
cation of the news story. 98
We submit that to engage in this "newsworthiness" analysis in cases of
newsgatherer wrongdoing only obscures the simple but powerful principle
that newsgatherers are not immune from laws of general applicability. By
measuring the newsworthiness of the subject matter against the plaintiff's
right to privacy, courts will surely be creating dangerously subjective and ad
hoc exceptions. 99 The First Amendment's protections have historically been
applied to only a limited number of torts, the most well-known of which is
defamation."° Those courts that have balanced newsworthiness against the
level of intrusion have allowed the First Amendment to shield media wrong-
doing outside of the defamation context, and have permitted newsgatherers
to violate laws of general applicability without sanction. This flies in the
face of well-settled Supreme Court jurisprudence requiring that wrongdoers,
including the media, be held liable for their wrongful acts, and carves out an
unwarranted exception to the general rules of liability and damages.
9 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2417 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 26, 1981).
9' Id. at 2417-18.
9' Id. at 2419.
97 Id.
98 Id.
9 Justice Marshall, dissenting in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29
(1971), warned against the dangers of letting judges ascertain "newsworthiness." Id. at
81 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
100 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
1126 [Vol. 4:3
MEDIA MISBEHAVIOR
B. Media Defenses to Intrusion and Trespass: Consent
Consent to a newsgatherer's activity may bar a later claim for intrusion
or trespass. Consent implied by custom was found to be a valid defense in
Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher.'"" In Fletcher, a news photographer
was invited by a fire marshal to accompany him into a burned-out home,
where, at the request of the marshall, he took a picture of a silhouette left
on the floor after removal of a dead body.1 2 The reporter subsequently
published the picture. °3 The mother of the deceased brought claims of
trespass, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress
against the newspaper." The Supreme Court of Florida held that there
was no valid claim of trespass due to consent predicated upon "common
custom and usage," namely, it was standard practice for the media to ac-
company officials to crime and accident scenes. 5 Fletcher, however, has
been held to be unique on its facts."
Some courts have held consent to be a valid defense even though the
newsgatherer may have exceeded the scope of the consent and/or fraudulent-
ly misrepresented his or her publication intentions. In Baugh v. CBS
Inc.,"° a CBS television news crew accompanied and videotaped a crisis
intervention team during a meeting at the plaintiff's home.' The plaintiff
claimed that she did not know the crew was taping for a television show,
and that the police had told her the news crew was from the DA's office
and there to help her." Plaintiff said that she let them stay only after they
agreed that the film would not be televised."' The court held that under
California law, even when consent is fraudulently induced, an individual has
no trespass or intrusion claim, but may have a fraud or intentional misrepre-
sentation claim."'
The current popularity of ride-alongs and other news and feature seg-
ments showing live footage of police or emergency authorities in action
'o' 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977).
102 Id. at 916.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 The law was "well-settled" in Florida that there was no trespass where peaceable
entry was made under this common custom and usage. Id. The court in Fletcher, how-
ever, failed to discuss whether consent was exceeded, thereby rendering it ineffective.
"o See Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768, 780-81 (Wis. 1980) (finding no First
Amendment privilege to trespass where reporter followed police onto private property,
and distinguishing Fletcher on the facts).
"o 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
'08 Id. at 750.
'09 Id. at 751.
110 Id. at 752.
... id. at 757.
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have produced new bases for newsgatherer intrusions. With few excep-
tions,"' courts have consistently found the media liable for trespass, intru-
sion, or fraud, and have not readily embraced defenses of express and im-
plied consent in these situations. In Anderson v. WROC-TV,"3 for exam-
ple, a New York court found that an invitation to enter a dwelling given to
a reporter by an officer executing a search warrant was not a valid defense
to a claim of trespass. In WROC-TV, an investigator for The Humane Soci-
ety of Rochester and Monroe County invited three television stations to send
newscasters and photographers to accompany him in executing a search
warrant of plaintiff's house."' The television stations filmed the interior of
the house despite the plaintiff's repeated requests to the television personnel
.to stay out of his home."' The video footage was subsequently broadcast
on the evening news."6 The plaintiff brought a trespass action, and defen-
dants asserted numerous defenses, including, inter alia, absolute privilege,
the public's right to access to information of public interest, and that the
entry was constitutionally protected under the First Amendment." 7 The
court granted plaintiff's motion to dismiss these defenses in all respects,
holding that "'[t]here is no threat to a free press in requiring its agents to
act within the law."' ' . The court further noted:
Although otherwise trespassory conduct may be legalized or
justified by lawful authority, such as an officer of the law
acting in the performance of his duty, such authority does
not extend by invitation, absent an emergency, to every and
any other member of the public, including members of the
news media."9
" See, for example, Belluomo v. KAKE TV & Radio, Inc., 596 P.2d 832 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1979), in which the appellate court in Kansas recognized the media's defense of
consent. In KAKE TV, television reporters accompanied and filmed a state inspection of
plaintiffs' restaurant. Id. at 835. The reporters filmed nonpublic areas, and the filming
was initially consented to by one of the restaurant owners. Id. at 836. Consent was
withdrawn by the other partner the following day. Id. Because the civil trespass action
was based on the actual entry and filming of the premises, and not the broadcast, the
withdrawal of consent was held to be irrelevant with respect to the trespass action. Id.
The court affirmed the jury's determination that the first partner's consent was not
fraudulently obtained. Id. at 843.
"3 441 N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sup. Ct. 1981).




11 Id. at 224 (quoting Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995-96 (2d Cir. 1973)).
119 Id. at 223 (citation omitted).
1128 [Vol. 4:3
MEDIA MISBEHAVIOR
Thus, courts have viewed consent as a defense to media intrusion with
increasing skepticism, and, guided by the Dietemann rationale, have limited
its application to situations of express consent or emergency situations.
C. Other Causes of Action
1. Contract Actions: Breach of Contract and Promissory Estoppel
Interests protected by certain laws of general applicability, such as "[t]he
right to contract freely with the expectation that the contract shall endure
according to its terms," have been held to be as fundamental to our society
as the right to speak and write without restraint. 20 It follows that constitu-
tional rights, including those protected by the First Amendment, can be
waived through contractual agreements.121 A constitutional defense to a
breach of contract claim is also difficult because such claims, unlike claims
in the tort context, usually arise from situations where the media has volun-
tarily agreed to certain limitations in exchange for information.
A court will usually uphold breach of contract claims if it finds that the
promise was clear and supported by consideration. For example, a New
York court upheld a claim against a newspaper that published a photograph
of an AIDS patient because the newspaper had made and broken a clear
promise to make him unidentifiable. 2 2 A federal court in the Fifth Circuit,
however, found against a plaintiff who brought a declaratory judgment ac-
tion to stop further distribution of a film based on a promise by the docu-
mentary film maker to "refrain from making the interview available to any
other media outlet,"'2 3 because the court found the contract to be ambigu-
ous."2 In Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc.,"2 however, the
Eighth Circuit reinstated a promissory estoppel claim based on an alleged
broken promise that plaintiff would not be "identified or identifiable"'2 in
a magazine article about therapist-patient sexual abuse, because the alleged
promise was sufficiently clear and definite.'27
In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., the Supreme Court held that a promisso-
ry estoppel claim, arising out of the truthful publication of the name of a
120 See Blount v. Smith, 231 N.E.2d 301, 305 (Ohio 1967).
121 See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam) (finding that
CIA employment contract forbidding CIA employees to publish anything without CIA
prepublication review did not violate the First Amendment).
'2 Anderson v. Strong Memorial Hosp., 573 N.Y.S.2d 828 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
123 Wildmon v. Berwick Universal Pictures, 803 F. Supp. 1167, 1171 (N.D. Miss.),
affid, 979 F.2d 21 (5th Cir. 1992).
124 Id. at 1174-75.
12 999 F.2d 1319 (8th Cir. 1993).
126 Id. at 1320.
127 Id. at 1322.
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source who had been promised confidentiality, was not barred by the First
Amendment."2 The majority distinguished Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing
Co."9 and Florida Star v. B.J.F."3° as involving certain content-based re-
strictions, and held that "[t]he parties themselves ... [must] determine the
scope of their legal obligations, and any restrictions that may be placed on
the publication of truthful information. 131 Thus, the Supreme Court in Co-
hen seems to have excised, quite deliberately, the applicability of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan and its progeny to certain contractual, and perhaps
tortious, causes of action against the media.'32
In an interesting recent development which occurred during the fall of
1995, CBS News abruptly canceled a segment of 60 Minutes regarding the
tobacco industry. The segment would have featured Dr. Jeffrey Wigand,
former head of research for the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation,
who purportedly would have disclosed tobacco industry secrets, notwith-
standing a confidentiality agreement between Dr. Wigand and his former
employer that was still in force.'33 CBS announced that it canceled the
segment because of the risk of a suit claiming substantial damages for tor-
tious interference with contract. T Apparently, the threat of financial liabil-
ity for interfering with a third party contract forced CBS to rethink its
producers' broadcast plans. By its decision not to broadcast information
disclosed by a contractually bound person in breach of that contract, CBS's
counsel may have recognized that CBS could be potentially liable for all
"2 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991).
129 443 U.S. 97 (1979). In Daily Mail, the Supreme Court discussed a line of cases
which suggest that "if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter
of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of
the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order." Id. at
103.
130 491 U.S. 524 (1989). In Florida Star, the Supreme Court, citing Daily Mail, pro-
tected the publication of lawfully obtained information, but limited its holding by ex-
pressly leaving open the question whether the publication of unlawfully obtained in-
formation may be constitutionally punished. Id. at 535 n.8 (noting that "the Daily Mail
principle does not settle the issue whether, in cases where information has been ac-
quired unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, government may ever punish not only
the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing publication as well").
'3' Cohen, 501 U.S. at 671.
,32 See Joseph W. Ragusa, Comment, Biting the Hand That Feeds You: The Report-
er-Confidential Source Relationship in the Wake of Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 67 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 125 (1993) (noting that after Cohen, only those common law claims
whose actionability rests solely on an act of expression and/or publication-e.g., defa-
mation or false light-will be subject to Sullivan-type constitutional scrutiny).
133 See Barnaby J. Feder, Former Tobacco Executive to Begin Telling Secrets to
Grand Jury, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1995, at A21.
134 Howard Kurtz, '60 Minutes' Kills Piece on Tobacco Industry; CBS Fears Law
Suit, Cites ABC Settlement, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1995, at A3.
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damages consequential to the broadcast, including damage to the reputation
and financial well-being of a member of the tobacco industry. 35
2. Fraud and Misrepresentation
Fraud and misrepresentation claims also are frequently invoked by the
victims of intrusive reporting. In Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,
two producers for ABC's Prime Time Live show submitted falsified employ-
ment applications and were subsequently hired at Food Lion stores in North
and South Carolina." The ABC producers used their own names and so-
cial security numbers on their employment applications, but completed the
rest of the applications with concocted employment histories, prearranged
references, and false personal backgrounds and reasons for seeking the posi-
tion. 37
After gaining entry to the stores, the producers wore concealed video
and audio equipment to obtain approximately fifty-five hours of tape of,
among other things, Food Lion employees in non-public areas of Food Lion
stores." The false backgrounds and references provided in the employ-
ment applications were assembled and coordinated using the U.S. mails and
interstate wire facilities. Food Lion alleged that these were predicate acts of
mail and wire fraud in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO).139 Food Lion also alleged various state law
claims for trespass, fraud, civil conspiracy, and violation of the North Caro-
lina Unfair Trade Practices Act. 4 On motion to dismiss, although dismiss-
ing the RICO claim because it found no "pattern," the court rejected ABC's
First Amendment-based "newsgathering" claim of immunity and allowed
Food Lion's state common law claims to go forward, based in part on its
interpretation of Cohen and Branzburg.4'
In Albertson v. TAK Communications, Inc., a reporter falsely told
the plaintiff that the camera was off, and filmed plaintiff without her con-
sent while she rolled a marijuana cigarette. 43 The court noted that the
135 Although 60 Minutes later broadcast the interview, it only did so after the Wall
Street Journal published excerpts of Dr. Wigand's grand jury testimony. CBS News
Wins Judge's Ruling in Tobacco Suit, WASH. POST, Feb. 29, 1996, at A12.
136 Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811, 814-15 (M.D.N.C.
1995).
137 Id. at 815.
138 Id. at 816.
139 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994).
" Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 822.
141 Id. at 821-23.
142 Albertson v. TAK Communications, Inc., No. 89-0052, 1989 WL 129270 (Wis.
Ct. App. Aug. 15, 1989).
143 Id. at *2.
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plaintiff was "entitled to recover compensation for injury resulting from
publication acquired through tortious conduct." 144 The court granted sum-
mary judgment to defendants, however, because the plaintiff could show no
damages to her reputation resulting from the alleged fraud because she had
already publicly admitted to marijuana use.145
Similarly, in New Jersey v. Cantor,146 a reporter's ruse to obtain an
interview with the mother of a homicide victim resulted in a criminal con-
viction for "impersonating a public official" because the reporter falsely told
the subject that she was "from the morgue."'' 47 In affirming the conviction,
the court specifically rejected the reporter's First Amendment defenses, and
as in Dietemann, noted that "defendant's status as a newsperson cannot
protect her from the application of the criminal laws.'
148
III. CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM
SUBSEQUENT PUBLICATION
As noted repeatedly throughout this Article, courts generally agree that
the First Amendment does not shield the media from liability for their
wrongful conduct. A logical system of justice, then, should hold the media
accountable for all damages proximately caused by their unlawful con-
duct.' The courts are still divided, however, regarding the appropriate
scope of damages to be awarded to a victim of unlawful media conduct
where there is subsequent publication.
14 Id.
145 Id.
146 534 A.2d 83 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987), cert. denied, 540 A.2d 1274 (N.J.
1988).
14' Id. at 84.
141 Id. at 86.
141 In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), the Supreme Court held
that the First Amendment prohibited evangelist Jerry Falwell from recovering damages
from Hustler magazine under Virginia's general law of intentional infliction of emotion-
al distress. Id. at 53-54. In reviewing the Fourth Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court
held that although Falwell had proven all the elements of that state law cause of action,
allowing Falwell to recover damages without proof of a higher standard of fault would
chill protected expression. Id. Unlike its later decision in Cohen, however, the Supreme
Court in Hustler did not focus on whether Hustler had violated a general state law and
thus lost its First Amendment protection. Id. at 51-52. Instead, the Court in Hustler
readily recognized that Falwell had established his state claim and suffered damages
from emotional distress, but focused on the chilling effect that awarding damages to
Hustler would have on the expression of satirical or political commentary. The Court
thus found the "actual malice" test of Sullivan applicable. Id. The difference between
Hustler and Cohen is that the claim in Hustler, unlike that in Cohen, rested solely on
published expression. See also supra note 132.
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In Costlow v. Cusimano,5 ° for example, a New York state court held
that a plaintiff could not recover subsequent publication damages even
though the defendant obtained the published information by trespassing on
the plaintiff's property. 5' In Costlow, the defendant entered plaintiff's
property and photographed plaintiff's two children who had suffocated in a
refrigerator.'52 The court refused to award the plaintiff damages arising
from publication of the photographs on the basis of the trespass claim, stat-
ing that the publication was a separable act from the trespass, "more proper-
ly allocated under other categories of liability."'53 The court reasoned that
the complaint failed to allege damages proper to a trespass action-a tres-
passer may only be liable for physical harm done while on another's
land. 54 Because the tort of trespass is designed to protect interests in pos-
session of property, the court held that "damages for trespass are limited to
consequences flowing from the interference with possession and not for
separable acts more properly allocated under other categories of liabili-
ty."' 55 The court distinguished other cases where the harms arose directly
from the trespass, and noted that here, the "harm rose as a consequence of
acts performed after the trespass."'56
The Ninth Circuit in Dietemann, however, viewed the situation different-
ly, and noted that the failure to award damages resulting from publication
would undercompensate the plaintiff for the "real harm done to him."'5 7
Thus, the court held that a plaintiff could recover damages resulting from
subsequent publication of information obtained by a reporter's tortious intru-
sion. 5 The court in Dietemann noted that "[n]o interest protected by the
First Amendment is adversely affected by permitting damages for intrusion
to be enhanced by the fact of later publication of the information that the
publisher improperly acquired."' 59 The court did not even award any dam-
ages for the actual intrusion. Rather, it merely affirmed the trial court's
$1000 verdict which was based solely upon the publication of the informa-
tion acquired by the intrusion. 6' Absent the award of damages based upon
311 N.Y.S.2d 92 (App. Div. 1970).
151 Id. at 97.
152 Id. at 93.
153 Id. at 97.
" Id. The court also noted that an action under New York's statutory right to priva-
cy could not stand absent a showing of subject matter not suitable for public concern
and falsification resulting from actual malice. Id. at 95 (citing N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW
§ 51 (Consol. 1976)).
155 Id. at 97.
156 Id. (emphasis added).
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the publication, the plaintiff in Dietemann would have gone completely
uncompensated for the intrusion.'
Unfortunately, because both courts looked outside the general rules of
damages to justify their results, the inquiry in those cases was misplaced,
and the results unnecessarily confusing. Both courts weighed First Amend-
ment interests and asked whether the First Amendment precluded the dam-
age award and whether the damage award would interfere with or jeopardize
"the public's right to know." Instead, the courts simply should have heeded
the Supreme Court's maxim: "generally applicable laws do not offend the
First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has
incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news."'62 General
rules of damages require that a victim be compensated for all consequential
damages proximately caused by the breach of a duty to that individual.'63
It follows that media defendants, who are not exempt from laws of general
applicability, should be liable, like everyone else, for all consequential and
proximate losses resulting from their unlawful activities," including,
where appropriate, punitive damages.'65 Put another way, once the media
161 Id.
162 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991). See generally supra Part
I.
13 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 917 (1977).
This is especially true in light of the Supreme Court's aversion to granting prior
restraints to publication. See, e.g., CBS Inc. v. Davis, 114 S. Ct. 912 (Blackmun, Circuit
Justice 1994) (refusing to sustain an injunction barring CBS from airing a videotape of
operations at a meat-packing plant, and noting that the appropriate remedy should be a
damage claim in a defamation or trespass action); see also Proctor & Gamble Co. v.
Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a temporary restraint on
pure speech is improper absent the most compelling circumstances). In Bankers Trust,
Business Week magazine had obtained documents from the Bankers Trust/Proctor &
Gamble litigation that were under seal. Id. at 222. Bankers Trust and Proctor & Gamble
sought and received an injunction from the district court prohibiting Business Week
from publishing an article disclosing the contents of these secret documents. Id. at 222-
23. On subsequent appeal, the Sixth Circuit vacated the order and noted that "in the
case of a prior restraint on pure speech, the hurdle is substantially higher [than a gener-
al temporary restraining order]: publication must threaten an interest more fundamental
than the First Amendment itself." Id. at 226-27. The Sixth Circuit also criticized the
district court for inquiring into "how" Business Week obtained the documents. Id. at
225. As in Davis, the extraordinary nature of the prior restraint doctrine makes it singu-
larly inappropriate to inquire into the means by which the information was obtained.
But, as noted above, Justice Blackmun stated in Davis that it is entirely appropriate to
make this inquiry in a damages action for defamation or trespass.
16' Punitive damages can be awarded for intentional torts such as intrusion, trespass,
and fraud. The court in Le Mistral noted that if the tort is "aggravated by evil or a
wrongful motive or ... there was wilful and intentional misdoing, or a reckless indif-
ference equivalent thereto," punitive damages may be awarded, as long as the defendant
is allowed to explain his motivation. See Le Mistral, Inc. v. CBS Inc., 402 N.Y.S.2d
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engage in unlawful conduct, the First Amendment no longer shields the
defendant from such liability. The First Amendment should not then resur-
face in the case to limit recoverable damages.
A. Proximate Cause
The basic rule of tort damages is that a victim may recover any loss that
was "proximately caused" by the tort. 166 In cases of intrusion, this usually
includes damages to the plaintiff's privacy interest, peace of mind, and any
specifically provable or special damage. 67 In trespass cases, recovery often
includes harm to the owner's interest in his or her exclusive possession of
property. The plaintiff may also recover any additional loss "proximately" or
"naturally" caused by the trespass. 68 Similarly, a victim of fraud is enti-
tled to recover all consequential damages proximately caused by the fraudu-
lent conduct. 169 Because trespass, intrusion, and fraud are intentional torts,
the same considerations apply when determining what is a "proximate" or
compensable result of the defendant's conduct. 70 As with all intentional
torts, the defendant need only to have intended the act, not the resulting
damages, to be permitted to recover damages that were a proximate or direct
result of the intended wrongdoing.'' Furthermore, in determining the issue
of direct or proximate causation for intentional torts, the courts implicitly or
explicitly have adopted the general doctrine that there is "extended liability"
for intentional torts, and thus the rules of proximate causation are more
liberally applied in cases of intrusion, trespass, and fraud, for example, than
in cases of mere negligence.'
815, 817 (App. Div. 1978). Similarly, in Belluomo v. KAKE TV, 596 P.2d 832, 842
(Kan. Ct. App. 1979) and Anderson v. WROC-TV, 441 N.Y.S.2d 220, 222 n.1 (Sup.
Ct. 1981), the state courts noted that punitive damages may be awarded against media
defendants for intentional torts such as intrusion, trespass, and fraud. Nevertheless, there
may be no liability where the defendant committed an actionable intentional tort without
bad faith or improper motivation. See DAVID A. ELDER, THE LAW OF PRIVACY § 2:10
(1991).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 917.
167 Id; see also ELDER, supra note 165, § 2:10.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 917; see also KAKE TV, 596 P.2d at 840
(noting that an injured party in a civil trespass action is entitled to recover at least
nominal damages and all damages that are a direct result of the trespass, even though
the damages were not sustained until some time after the act of trespass was commit-
ted).
169 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549.
170 See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 41-44 (4th ed.
1971).
17' ELDER, supra note 165, § 2:10.
172 id. *
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The equivalent of "proximate cause" can also be found in contract cases.
Like tort cases, recoverable damages for breach of contract are those damag-
es that are "proximate results of the breach" and "within the contemplation
of the defaulting party as determined by the doctrine of foreseeability.""'
In a breach of contract suit, therefore, a plaintiff may usually recover all
expectation interests, reliance interests, or restitution interests.'74 Thus, it
can be said that recoverable damages are always defined as those proximate-
ly caused by the wrong, whether plaintiff's theory of recovery rests in tort
or in contract."
To determine whether an act is the "proximate cause" of the alleged
harm, the court or jury must determine whether the resulting consequences
were "foreseeable" when the defendant initially acted.'76 Some courts fol-
low a "direct consequences" test, which holds a defendant liable for any
consequences that "flow directly" from the effect of his acts upon existing
or operating conditions and forces. 77
Applying these general damage rules of causation and foreseeability to
intentional illegal newsgathering activities, it seems clear that newsgathering
defendants who commit an intrusion, trespass, act of fraud, or break a prom-
ise, with the intent of publishing information obtained thereby, could reason-
ably foresee both certain injuries caused by the antecedent unlawful act as
well as additional losses flowing from the publication. If publication of the
material was in fact the newsgatherers' intention when the illegal act was
committed, damages resulting therefrom are absolutely foreseeable, as well
as "a direct consequence" of the initial illegal information-gathering activity.
In Belluomo v. KAKE TV, 78 although the court denied plaintiffs' tres-
pass claim based on a defense of consent, it clearly noted that if an action-
able trespass had been found, "[t]here was sufficient competent evidence
upon which to award compensatory and punitive damages."'7 Plaintiffs
had contended that the broadcast on August 28 was the "fruit" of the July
30 filming in the nonpublic areas of their business. 8° The plaintiffs' claim
173 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 454 (1988).
174 See id.
175 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1981).
176 See PROSSER, supra note 170, § 42; see also Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986,
998 (2d Cir. 1973) (noting that the injunction was warranted because Galella's conduct
was "foreseeably or reasonably calculated" to harass).
177 PROSSER, supra note 170, § 42; see also Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep.
145, 151 (1854) (holding, in the quintessential "consequential damages" contract case
that a breaching party should be held liable only for foreseeable consequences of the
breach).
178 596 P.2d 832 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979). For a discussion of the facts of KAKE TV,
see supra note 112.
179 Id. at 840.
180 Id.
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for relief included compensatory damages based upon evidence of diminu-
tion of the customer patronage and sales following the broadcast date, and
punitive damages based upon evidence that fraudulent representation by
defendant's newsmen induced the consent.'81 Thus, the court was willing
to entertain a request for damages arising out of subsequent publication.
Similarly, in Le Mistral, a New York court ruling on a trespass claim ac-
knowledged that "[s]crutiny of the record demonstrate[d] an adequate basis
to justify the compensatory damage award rendered by the jury."'182 Al-
though the court did not itemize the damage award, it seems likely that part
of the $1200 compensatory damages awarded by the jury related to injury
caused by the subsequent broadcast.
In Desnick v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,'83 defendant's Prime Time Live
program sent persons with concealed video recorders to pose as patients to
obtain footage of an ophthalmologist performing cataract surgery." Plain-
tiff subsequently alleged claims for trespass and intrusion. The federal dis-
trict court held that under Illinois law there was no claim for intrusion be-
cause the alleged harm did not arise from the intrusion itself but rather from
the subsequent broadcast.8 5 This opinion suggests that the intrusion and
the subsequent publication are separable and distinct acts, and thus not prox-
imately related.
In Dietemann, however, the Ninth Circuit did not separate the antecedent
unlawful invasion of privacy from the subsequent publication, and affirmed
an award to plaintiff that included damages for the subsequent publica-
tion. 6 The Dietemann decision squarely and accurately follows prior Su-
preme Court jurisprudence, and respects the principle that the media shall be
subject to all rules of general applicability.
B. Newsworthiness of the Published Information
In Dietemann, the court extended the general rule of compensatory dam-
ages to the newsgathering context because it believed this was necessary to
protect people from newsgatherer conduct that served no "legitimate interest
of the public in being informed."'8 7 Thus, Dietemann's damage rule for
newsgatherer liability may be interpreted as applying the general proximate
cause standard for both the antecedent newsgathering act and the subsequent
publication only when the information published is not of "public inter-
I d.
182 Le Mistral, Inc. v. CBS Inc., 402 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817 (App. Div. 1978).
'8 851 F. Supp. 303 (N.D. Il1. 1994), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds,
44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995).
14 Id. at 305.
185 Id. at 306-13.
186 Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 250 (9th Cir. 1971).
187 Id.
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est."' 8 This, unfortunately, would encourage courts to engage in a First
Amendment/newsworthiness balancing analysis, thus losing sight of the
general and universally applied rules of damages. Dietemann need not be
read in such a limiting manner.
Some argue that the danger of an across-the-board proximate cause
standard-one that would compensate for losses resulting from publication
without an inquiry into the "newsworthiness" of the subject matter-is that
it may deter socially desirable reporting and interfere with "the public's
right to know," as well as subject the media to unpredictable and astronomi-
cal financial liability.'89 We believe that a distinction should not be made
between matters of public versus private interest when determining publica-
tion damages in the tort and contract setting, as there is in a cause of action
for defamation. 9 ° Whether a published story is within the "public interest"
should not be the determinative factor in permitting or precluding compensa-
tory damages arising from publication of wrongfully obtained material. An
analysis of the "newsworthiness" of a publication would only obscure and
frustrate the important principle that newsgatherers must be held accountable
for all of the consequences of their wrongful conduct.
The media does not have a special license to enter private property in
search of news. Our society has chosen to protect an individual's sphere of
privacy with various common laws and statutes, and our Constitution re-
quires that the people's own surrogates, the police, obtain appropriate search
warrants and subpoenas before they may investigate an incident. 9 ' In light
188 Id.
189 See King & Muto, supra note 14. Under the Cohen and Dietemann damages rule,
the media arguably may be less willing to investigate possible corruption or other
wrongdoing for fear of financial liability after the report, however truthful, is aired. Pro-
fessors King and Muto present an interesting scenario. They posit, for example, that
Woodward and Bernstein had committed a trespass or intrusion during the Watergate
investigations, and the Washington Post published the illegally obtained information.
Under a general "proximate cause" damage rule, President Nixon would theoretically be
permitted to recover all damages proximately caused by the trespass, including the emo-
tional and mental disgrace of his subsequent resignation. This, obviously, would not be
in the best interests of the public. Id. at 942. We argue, however, that media investiga-
tions should be conducted legally and through proper channels so as not to violate any
laws. Holding newsgatherers accountable for the consequences of unlawful activi-
ties-as are government agents and investigators-would not interfere with the overall
efficacy of public dissemination of important information any more than constitutional
exclusionary rules interfere with society's need to prosecute criminals. Just as society is,
on balance, better off when our government plays by the rules, forcing newsgatherers to
do their work within the confines of established laws produces a similar, overall societal
good.
"g For a detailed discussion of the "privilege" to publicize matters of public interest,
see PROSSER, supra note 170, § 118.
'' See United States v. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149, 158 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting that
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of this, the media should not then be permitted to substitute, with impunity,
illegal investigative procedures for. lawful ones under the guise of
"newsgathering." There is no good basis to carve out a special exception to
the general rules of damages for wrongful media conduct.
Further, an inquiry into the "newsworthiness" of the published informa-
tion would mean that the extent of a newsgatherer's liability for damages
would depend on the fortuitous event that he or she actually unearthed
something of "public concern." Such a standard would encourage fishing
expeditions into zones of privacy with hopes of hooking a "newsworthy"
story. Accordingly, the court in Dietemann did not measure the
newsworthiness of the subject matter. Rather, the court assumed a legitimate
public interest and focused on the method of newsgathering, concluding that
no First Amendment interest protects the news media from "calculated mis-
deeds."'92 Similarly, in Miller v. NBC,"3 the California Court of Appeals
held that a television network's constitutionally recognized right to gather
news did not preclude a widow's cause of action against the network for
invasion of privacy resulting from a network camera crew's accompanying
paramedics into her apartment and filming the unsuccessful efforts to revive
her spouse who had suffered a heart attack."' The court properly ignored
the "newsworthiness" of the subject matter and instead focused on the un-
derlying tort-a trespass by means of an unauthorized entry into the private
premises of an individual's home. 95
In Anderson v. WROC-TV, a New York court expressly declined to
invoke a privilege based on the balance between the scope of a
newsgatherer's intrusion and the newsworthiness of the story obtained
through that intrusion. 96 The court in WROC-TV found a test based on the
balancing of the newsworthiness of a story against the degree of intrusion to
be inappropriate because a determination of newsworthiness would be sub-
ject to "vague, subjective criteria."'97 Similarly, the Supreme Court has
permitting reporters a privilege to enter dwellings would be equivalent to "the writs of
assistance which were so odious to the American colonists"); see also supra notes 19-
21 and accompanying text (discussing the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment
and its meaningful comparison to our argument for subjecting the media to damages for
wrongful conduct, including damages arising from subsequent publication).
192 Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249-50 (noting that the "First Amendment is not a license
to trespass, to steal, or to intrude by electronic means into the precincts of another's
home or office. It does not become such a license simply because the person subjected
to the intrusion is reasonably suspected of committing a crime.") (footnote omitted).
" 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Ct. App. 1986).
I9 d. at 670.
195 Id. Unfortunately, Miller's holding can also be interpreted as applying only where
the story is not newsworthy.
19 Anderson v. WROC-TV, 441 N.Y.S.2d 220, 224 (Sup. Ct. 1981).
'9 Id. at 225; see also supra note 99 (discussing Justice Marshall's dissent in
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indicated in defamation cases the undesirability of imposing on courts the
task of determining "on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues
of 'general or public interest' and which do not." '
In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,1 99 the Supreme Court struck
down a West Virginia penal statute prohibiting publication of the name of a
child who was the subject of criminal proceedings. Although the Court
noted that the newsworthiness of the material was important, it also implied
that the newsworthiness may be insufficient to fend off an intrusion claim if
the material was not obtained in a lawful manner.2" The Court stated: "if
a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public
significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication
of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest
order."' Although the civil damages context of this Article is certainly
different from Smith's context of a penal statute, the Court's language seems
to imply that if the material was not obtained lawfully, remedial, conse-
quences such as an award of damages resulting from publication would not
offend the Constitution.
C. Are Reputational Damages Resulting from Publication of Unlawfully
Obtained Information Recoverable Without Proof of Sullivan Fault?
Assuming that damages resulting from publication of the fruits of law
violations are recoverable, it is still unclear whether courts would permit a
judgment for injuries to "reputation.""2 2 The Supreme Court in Cohen, in
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), where he warned against such ad
hoc determinations).
198 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).
199 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
Id. at 103.
2o Id. (emphasis added); see also Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989)
(finding that where a newspaper publishes truthful information lawfully obtained, pun-
ishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state inter-
est of the highest order).
202 See ELDER, supra note 165, § 2:10 (noting that plaintiffs can usually claim an in-
jury to reputation precipitated by or proximately resulting from an intrusion, and that
cases generally have imposed liability on the defendant for any enhancement or aggra-
vation of plaintiff's damages caused by defendant's publication of information garnered
by the tortious intrusion); see also Jorgensen v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 905 F.2d 515
(1st Cir. 1990). In Jorgensen, a non-media case, the First Circuit declined to hold that
damages for injury to reputation may only be recovered in a defamation action, and not-
ed, in dicta, that defamation law does not preempt other claims alleging injury to repu-
tation. Id. at 519. The court, however, did not award the plaintiff "reputational damag-
es" in that case because the defendant "could not have foreseen the injury to the pilot's
reputation," and plaintiffs had not presented sufficient evidence that defendant's negli-
gence "proximately caused" their reputational injury. Id. at 522-27. Some courts have
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deciding whether certain damages for promissory estoppel were precluded
by the First Amendment, noted:
The payment of compensatory damages in this case is consti-
tutionally indistinguishable from a generous bonus paid to a
confidential news source ... [and] the characterization of the
payment makes no difference for First Amendment purposes
when the law being applied is a general law and does not
single out the press." 3
In Cohen, however, the Court left a very important question unanswered.
The Court remanded the issue of damages, stating that "Cohen [is not] at-
tempting to use a promissory estoppel cause of action to avoid the strict
requirements for establishing a libel or defamation claim."2' Moreover,
the Court continued, "Cohen is not seeking damages for injury to his reputa-
tion or his state of mind. He sought damages in excess of $50,000 for
breach of a promise that caused him to lose his job and lowered his earning
capacity."2 5 On remand, the Minnesota Supreme Court reinstated the
$200,000 compensatory damage award, but did not clearly define the specif-
ic composition of the award.2" The exact nature of what is permissibly
recoverable is thus still left unanswered.
If the Court truly followed its own rule that the media is held to laws of
general applicability, it would seem that all injuries resulting from an unlaw-
ful act, including those injuries to reputation resulting from subsequent
publication of the material so obtained, should be recoverable. Again, the
only real question a court should ask is to what extent the injury resulting
from the subsequent publication was, in fact, proximately caused by the
initial, intentional tortious or unlawful act.
In Belluomo v. KAKE TV & Radio, Inc., plaintiffs sought recovery for
alleged business losses resulting from the defendant's filming and televising
of a health inspector's visit to the plaintiff's restaurant. 7 The court held
that the reporters had entered with consent, and thus were not liable.2'
The court noted in dicta, however, that had the defendant's conduct not been
privileged, the plaintiffs would have been entitled to recover the losses in
held that a plaintiff cannot recover for reputational damages arising out of an alleged
breach of contract. See 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 484 (1988).
' Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 ,U.S. 663, 670 (1991).
201 Id. at 671.
205 Id.
'0 479 N.W.2d 387, 392 (Minn. 1992).
596 P.2d 832, 835 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979).
208 Id. at 843.
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business which resulted from publication of the film.2" Similarly, in CBS
Inc. v. Davis,21 ° Justice Blackmun denied plaintiff Federal Beef's request
for injunctive relief, but acknowledged that the company would probably
suffer financially if the segment appeared on national television, and noted
that Federal Beef could subsequently pursue a damages claim in a civil or
criminal trespass suit."'
In Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., most of plaintiff's dam-
ages were not a result of the ABC producers' misrepresentations to obtain
jobs, or from the entry of ABC News personnel onto Food Lion premises,
or even from the acts of videotaping that took place there. Rather, the mas-
sive business losses that Food Lion alleged were the direct results of the
subsequent production and broadcast of the story on Prime Time Live, con-
taining videotaped elements that were obtained by those premeditated ac-
tions. Citing Cohen, the court in Food Lion indicated that reputational dam-
ages are not recoverable, but failed to provide any framework for determin-
ing what constitutes "damage to reputation. '212 The court noted that
"[a]lthough Food Lion may not recover publication damages for injury to its
reputation, it may recover any non-reputational damages it allegedly suffered
to the extent recoverable under [state law] and other laws governing the
remaining claims."2 3 Noting the magistrate's recommendation, the court
observed enigmatically that "Food Lion seeks to recover for injuries alleged
to have been caused by ABC's Prime Time Live broadcast. These alleged
injuries are both reputational and non-reputational in nature."21 Thus,
Food Lion's damages from the broadcast were characterized as both
"reputational" and "non-reputational." The court appears to have carved out
a "non-reputational" subset of publication damages, and has declared that
those may be recovered constitutionally." 5
The court in Food Lion was clearly mindful of Cohen's holding that the
media are subject to laws of general applicability, but also stressed that the
Court had stated that "'Cohen [was not] attempting to use a promissory
estoppel cause of action to avoid the strict requirements for establishing a
libel or defamation claim .... Cohen is not seeking damages for injury to
his reputation or his state of mind.' 2 16 Instead, Cohen was seeking dam-
id. at 842.
210 114 S. Ct. 912 (Blackmun, Circuit Justice 1994).
211 Id. at 914; see also supra note 164.
212 887 F. Supp. 811, 823 n.3 (M.D.N.C. 1995) (refusing specifically to determine the
composition of "reputational" damages).
213 Id. at 822 n.1.
214 Id. at 822.
21' "Defamation" does not necessarily preempt other common law claims for
reputational injury and thus damages for injury to reputation may be constitutionally re-
covered outside of a defamation context. See supra note 202.
216 Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 822 (quoting Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S.
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ages for loss of employment, which was a direct result of the truthful, but
promise-breaking, publication of his identity.
Thus, referring again to Cohen, the district court in Food Lion noted:
Where a plaintiff sought recovery for non-reputational or
non-state of mind injuries, the Court [in Cohen] indicated
that such a plaintiff could recover these damages without
offending the First Amendment. Where, however, a plaintiff
seeks to use a generally applicable law to recover for injury
to reputation or state of mind while avoiding the require-
ments of a defamation claim (requiring proof of falsity and
actual malice), the Cohen holding does not appear to be
applicable.217
The court in Food Lion seemed to have confused, and thus failed to
draw a distinction between, publication damages and reputation damages.
After a long discussion of why the media should be held accountable for its
wrongful conduct and the inapplicability of the First Amendment to such
conduct, the court opined that damages, although recoverable, should not
include "damages to reputation., 218 Nevertheless, the court then took a
non-sequential leap and stated:
Food Lion may recover only those damages resulting from
ABC's alleged trespass, fraud, unfair and deceptive trade
practices, as well as those from the other remaining claims.
However, Food Lion may not recover any publication dam-
ages for injury to its reputation as a result of the Prime Time
Live broadcast.219
Thus, the court unnecessarily blurred the distinction between reputation
damages and publication damages, precluding Food Lion from collecting
any damages resulting from the subsequent publication, undoubtedly the
bulk of its alleged injury.
663, 671 (1991)) (emphasis removed).
217 Id. at 823.
218 Id. at 822-23.
219 Id. at 823 (emphasis added). In terms of the court's "may not recover" language,
the court arguably meant "may not recover without proof of fault which meets the
Sullivan test."
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CONCLUSION
Driven by competition, the need for profits, and demands for higher
ratings or circulations, and provided with technological marvels such as
ever-smaller video cameras and tape machines, the media have shown an
increasing willingness to engage in unlawful methods of newsgathering. The
need to ensure that all citizens, including newsgatherers, obey all laws of
general applicability is a compelling state interest of the highest order that
justifies holding the media liable for all damages, including consequential
publication damages, arising from their unlawful or tortious acts.
The First Amendment provides important protection for our cherished
freedoms of speech and the press, and the public's "right to know." The
First Amendment, however, should not be turned into a license to infringe
upon the protected privacy or property interests of others and to violate
general laws, nor should it be invoked to shield or insulate offenders from
liability for the consequences of such wrongdoing. Any rule to the contrary
insulates the press from liability for damages consequential to its illegal
acts, in violation of the Supreme Court's oft-stated mandate that lakws of
general applicability apply equally to the press as to any other citizen. Thus,
all citizens and institutions, regardless of occupation or calling, must take
full responsibility for all the consequences of their transgressions, and pay
the "wages of sin."
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